Factors Determining Wages
There are many situations in which one human works for another. They
range from slave to partner. The range of differences in power between
counterparts in these relations differ greatly from slave and master to
partner and partner. A third factor to consider is the size of the pool
of laborers not already employed. Records of slavery practiced against
individuals show that slavers had clear knowledge of the amount of food
necessary to maintain the lives of slaves, the amount necessary to
maintain productivity, etc. In wartime Germany and Japan, captured
soldiers, foreign nationals, and certain minorities were enslaved and
individuals were considered entirely expendable. Keeping prisoners
alive required a certain amount of food. Keeping prisoners alive and
working required more. When food was not available in the required
quantities, work would suffer and slaves might die. But the labor pool
was plentiful.
Slave holders in the United States took care to preserve their
investments. Slaves were valuable property, both because of their use
in the ardurous work of harvesting cash crops such as cotton and
tobacco, and also for their status as capital goods. Raising a slave
with a good constitution to saleable age was a good investment for the
slave masters.
After the Civil War ended in the United States, the legal status of
those who had been slaves changed. However, the economics of raising
crops requiring great numbers of workers, especially at harvest time,
had not changed. The owners of plantations needed to employ the same
number of workers, and it was in their interest to reproduce the
conditions of life under slavery as closely as possible. It was most
profitable for the plantation owners to pay the least wages that, in
combination with repressive means, could hold an adequate labor force
in their employ. In some ways the plantation owners were freer to cut
costs because, no longer owning their workers, as long as they could
maintain adequate work for numbers the fate of those who fell out of
this virtually captive work force was of no concern to them.
Sharecroppers could be exploited to the point that they could only
marginally maintain theor own health and safety. No concern need be
given to education, recreation, or other "frills."
A similar system of landlord-tenant relationships was maintained for
hundreds of years in China, and the bitter feelings that had
accumulated by the nineteenth century fueled both the revolution that
ended the Manchu Qing dynasty and the following communist revolution
that siezed control from the Nationalist party, the KMT (國民黨 Guó Mín
Dǎng or Kuo Min Tang in the old romanization system). The CCP (Chinese
Communist Party) supported much of its nation-building efforts by
acerbic attacks against the old land lord class. The KMT only began to
make real progress when, after their territory was reduced to Taiwan,
they conducted a thorough land-reform policy that ended the age of the
land lords and transformed the former land lords by giving them
incentives to invest their wealth and capabilities in capitalist
enterprises. Experiences of generation after generation of tenant
farmers indicated to everyone that there was no decent form of
paternalism at work in the vast majority of these relationships. Land
owners took as much as possible of the wealth gained by farming for
their own use. Patterns of arbitrary control that may have been worked
out in order to rule over tenant farmers and other servants were even
applied by elders to the younger generations of their own families, and
the position even of married women, concubines, and women who were
sexually available to the land owners were very similar to the
positions of complete slaves. To get a semi-autobiographical account of
life under this system, read the novel Family by Ba Jin. (See The Family translated by Wu Jingyu.)
Examine the situation of workers and employers in the world today. What
conditions place limits on the jobs that workers are willing to take,
absent any of the overt coercive factors seen in prisons and in
countries that are run like prisons? The ultimate limitation is that
ill-paid workers become too infirm to work productively (a detriment to
the employer), too infirm to work, or die. Unless there are high rates
of unemployment that might make workers stay on the job to at least
have stomachs that are partially full, unless there are no social
safety nets that provide a survival-level income to unemployed people,
then workers will not work without the prospect of being able to stay
alive at these jobs. In some cases, workers will remain homeless while
accepting part-time and/or bare-survival jobs. The only financial
reason an employer would pay more than the bare minimum would be
considerations of training new laborers after the old have departed.
Employers in industries that involve unskilled laborers and produce
products with no observable advantages over the products of their
direct competitors may be forced to pay no more than their competitors
wage rates because otherwise their products would be priced out of the
market.
Supply and demand conditions dictate that higher wages will be paid
only when the supply of workers needed for a certain class of laborers
is limited, forcing the employers to compete with each other on the
basis of compensations offered to laborers. In this matter employers
have some flexability since workers may be willing to work for lower
wages if they get health insurance, on-site daycare, or some other kind
of service that would be expensive for them but can be bought for less
by the employer because of the business's buying power. Furthermore,
any attempt by a relatively small competitor in a market to give higher
wages might be met by their counterparts deliberately lowering their
prices to force the deviant employer out of business. If corporations
are "persons," they are probably sociopaths.
A second determinant on the dispersion of wealth gained by a factory or
other business is how much local, county, state, and federal
governments take in taxes. Typically, business owners will argue that a
raise in taxes will force them to discharge employees.
A third determinant is the share allotted to themselves by the owners,
corporate officers, etc. Certain amounts must be devoted to
maintenance, capital expenses such as essential replacement of
manufacturing equipment, etc. Typically businesses will allocate some
funds to regional charities and other such public-relations
opportunities.
Government is at least theoretically in complete control of taxation.
Neither management, labor, nor any other interested parties have any
direct way of affecting this amount, so it can be treated as a constant
so far as anything done within the scope of the financial year.
The amounts allocated to non-salary compensation to workers, e.g.,
health insurance, to wages, and to management are entirely up to
management except in the increasingly rare situations where labor
unions represent workers' interests
It has somehow come to be accepted that the only purpose of a
corporation is to make money for its shareholders. If this idea is
accepted as an axiom, then it appears that management must look for tax
loopholes so as to limit that loss to shareholders, limit non-salary
compensation to workers that cannot be justified as actually adding to
the bottom line, and limiting to the bare minimum the wages paid to
workers, keeping in mind that below some limit production will suffer.
To judge by the incredible increases in salaries and bonuses to
management over the past few decades, management will not limit its own
salaries to increase the payout to investors unless the latter organize
themselves to force management to cut back.
Within a nation such as the United States, this problematical situation
with regard to the compensation offered to workers is a variant of the
Tragedy of the Commons. When some land in England was held as the
private property of the landed classes, and some land was held in
common by all residents of an area, the only way to control
exploitation of the commons (typically as pasture) was for each
individual engaged in animal husbandry to raise more sheep or other
hebivores and therefore indirectly harvest more forage. While 20 sheep
might be scrawnier than 10 sheep raised on the same piece of land, the
total forage transformed into meat would be greater for the larger
number of animals. However, taken to an extreme, the pastures became
overwhelmed by browing and the whole system could fail. The answer had
to be to find one way or another to cap the number of grazing animals
and allocate a percentage to each husbandryman. The end result,
however, was the end of the commons. Originally, matters could have
been handled by individuals all agreeing not to over-pasture the land,
but human nature evidently never even made that a possibility that some
community tried to realize. It would only take one non-compliant
individual to ruin that scheme.
In the labor situation, one employer might have a conscience and
attempt to provide workers with higher wages. However, high owner
earnings are a function of rake-off. Employers with only a few workers
cannot ordinarily pay themselves much more than they pay their workers.
If twelve workers are paid a minimum living wage of $11,000 and they
each earn $12,000 for the company, then the owner can have $12,000 for
himself. However, if 120 workers are paid the same way and provide the
company with the same earnings, then the owner can have $120,000 for
himself. Turn this dynamic around and it is clear that an owner with
1,000 workers can do nicely with a much smaller rake-off. However, if
that owner later decides to take less for himself and distribute the
balance among employees, then that will mean that each employee is
benefitted relatively little.
A more promising approach would be for the company to charge more per
widget, and earn enough more money that it could afford to increase
worker wages. In the end it might reap benefits to itself by this
change since workers would be more contented, would work in better
health and with better morale, etc. However, the individual company
cannot do this any more than an individual husbandryman could seek to
save the commons by voluntarily reducing his own number of stock on the
pasture. The other companies would price this maverick company out of
the market, the company would fail, and the workers would become
unemployed.
It might well be that all or almost all of the heads of the various
companies in this economy would favor paying employees more money, but
they know what will happen if they move independently. It therefore is
an unavoidable consequence that government must act in pursuit of the
common good. It must enforce some level of minimum compensation for
workers, not only because it may comport with the desires and
intentions of many employers, but also because it is a social good for
all members of the society to achieve a reasonable standard of living.
When economies that can interact have not reached equilibrium, when the
wages that would support a worker adequately in one economy are far
lower than what is required in another economy, then another layer of
complexity is added. For instance, Mexican farm workers are willing to
take sub-standard wages and even work as undocumented workers subject
to all kinds of coercion from unscrupulous employers because the money
they manage to save will support their families back in Mexico in a way
their working in Mexico could not do. Manufacturers in cities bordering
on the US-Mexico border can hire laborers who work in the US but live
in Mexico. They will work for less and do work that is unappealing to
US citizens who can do better at other jobs. Manufacturers in the US
may establish entire factories in Mexico, pay workers the going rate in
that country, and sell their product to US markets. All of these things
can impact US workers who must now compete with people able to survive
on much lower salaries.
People who complain about government interference with capitalistic
principles by having government mandated minimum wage standards cannot
logically be opposed to free competition among laborers on both sides
of the border for the same jobs. China is just as capable of producing
laptop computers as is the US. Those computers will reach US markets
unless draconian import restrictions are imposed (which denies the
general advantage in wealth creation demonstrated to hold true for all
trading opportunities), and they certainly will reach other countries
where the US may be seeking to sell computers. The alternative to a
situation of anarchy in which foreign workers find it necessary to work
under sweatshop conditions and US workers lose their jobs is to
regulate international transactions to moderate the rate at which
equilibrium is reached while benefitting both e.g., Chinese workers who
need to be protected against exploitation by a new vampire capitalism
there, and US workers who need to have their jobs not migrate to China
so rapidly that their own economy does not have time to make a smooth
transition to new job opportunities.