If one [regularly] resides in a certain country, then one is said to be a resident of that country. If one owns a dwelling in a country, then one is not said to have that nation[ality]. The fruit of a peach tree is a peach. The fruit of a buckthorn tree is not a buckthorn. (It's a jujube.) To inquire about a person's illness is to inquire after the person. To loathe a person's illness is not to loathe the person. The ghost of a person is not a person. The ghost of one's elder brother is one's elder brother. To make sacrifice to the ghosts of other people is not to make sacrifice to other people. To make sacrifice to the ghost of one's elder brother is to make sacrifice to one's elder brother. If the eyes of a certain horse see, then we say that the horse sees. If the eyes of a certain horse are large, we do not say the horse is large. If the coat of a cow is brown, then we speak of it as a brown cow. If the coat of a cow is dense, we do not speak of it as a dense cow. We predicate of one horse "ma." We predicate of two horses "ma." Horses are creatures with four legs. One horse has four legs. We cannot say of the two horses (of which we just predicated "ma") that they have [a total of] four legs. Horses may be white. If there are two horses, then one of them may be white. It is not the case that one horse may be white. [It either is or is not.] These are cases of "one affirmation" and "one denial." (One kind of proposition is affirmed, and another proposition that is very similar in appearance to the first proposition is denied.)
• If "all one's time" is spent in a country, then one is a citizen of that country. If one has a temporary residence there, then one is not a citizen of that country. The name of some whole trees is the same as the name of the fruit. The name of some other whole trees is different from the name of their fruit. If we ask about a person's illness we indirectly ask about the welfare of the whole person. If we loathe a person's illness that does not mean we loathe him. The ghosts of other people are just ghosts. The ghosts of our relatives are all we have left of them and so for us they count as their entire beings. The entire horse is said to see, even though the organ of vision is specifically the eye. But the whole horse does not get called a large horse just because its eyes are large. The surface color of a horse being brown we speak of the entire horse being brown (ignoring the color of the internal parts of the horse that we cannot ordinarily see). We say of one horse that it belongs in the category of animals called "horse." We say of two horses that they both belong in the category of animals we call "horse." We know that horses have four legs. But we know that having four legs is a characteristic of each member of the set or category, not a characteristic of the category qua category. Horses as individuals they are whatever color or colors they actually are. There is nothing indeterminate about their colors. (There is, however, something indeterminate about what the color of the next horse I run into may be.)
• So we have to be careful about what we predicate of something on the basis of partial knowledge. There may be an element of convention concerning how we are to refer to things. Sometimes we focus on the subset (e.g., the loathsome illness of a person) and sometimes we focus on the superset (e.g., the rideability of a horse or other such animal). There are characteristics that pertain to members of a set, (and also, presumably, characteristics that pertain to the set itself -- e.g., horses are many so the set of horses is a large set).